I. Introduction
Bentham's theory of fictions has not yet been studied from a history of ideas perspective, though its originality has attracted the interest of philosophers since the 1930s. The very context in which it was rediscovered by Ogden is symptomatic of the bias which was adopted by commentators: Ogden himself belonged to the intellectual circle which contributed to a large extent to developing the ideas of the analytic school of philosophy. 1 In the reading of Bentham he and Wisdom proposed, they made frequent references to the works of Moore and Russell, whose writings they knew directly. Such background played an important part in the way Ogden reconstructed the theory of fictions from the unedited essays scattered in the Bowring edition. 2 Later on, as an interest in Bentham developed, the theory of fictions remained the field of philosophers and specialists in jurisprudence: Quine was followed by Hart, Postema and Harrison. Recent studies include Professor Jackson's in jurisprudence and Laval and Cléro's. 3 The last one is the only one which includes a detailed attempt at linking Bentham's methods to preceding works, and the authors insist especially on the mathematical and logical foundations of the theory of fictions.
Their philosophical outlook focuses on the methods used by Bentham. All the others take Bentham's originality for granted and see him as the forerunner of the analytic school. 4 I shall argue that their reading of Bentham's theory of fictions was greatly influenced by their retrospective outlook, and that Bentham's originality is better understood when his ideas are inscribed within the eighteenth-century debate of which it is partly a product.
In this paper, my definition of the theory of fictions takes from all the studies quoted above, but I have restricted it to its relevance to the eighteenth-century problematics of thought and language (though in Bentham's work it partakes of legal and constitutional theory and can only be understood within the utilitarian system as a whole). I shall therefore take Ross Harrison's definition as a starting-point: the theory of fictions is 'the project of analysing all that language whose terms do not refer to real entities into language whose terms do refer to real entities'. 5 It is in keeping with a definition proposed by Bentham: 'a fictitious entity is an object, the existence of which is feigned by the imagination, feigned for the purpose of discourse, and which, when so formed, is spoken of as a real one '. 6 In contrast to the philosophical studies I have mentioned, I shall adopt a different, more historical perspective: the theory of fictions was developed at the turn of the eighteenth and the nineteenth century -at the end of what has been identified as the European Enlightenment, by a thinker who was keen on inscribing his work into the intellectual tradition that had started with Descartes and Locke. 7 It was Bentham's own answer to the problems of the workings of the human mind which had been the main object of Enlightenment thought. It was also the work of a writer whose diversity of interests and proficiency embodied the eighteenth century ideal of humanism. In that, Bentham represented the end of an era when a man could have a reasonable knowledge of most scientific and philosophical areas. The theory of fictions, and more specifically, the reflection on language in which it is inscribed, is a topic in which Bentham's relevance to the intellectual tradition of his time can be studied in good conditions: the corpus of his works on language and fictions is relatively delimited, allusions to other writers are frequent enough, and the very idea of working on language is deeply ingrained in contemporary debate.
Such an attempt poses a series of methodological problems: there was no definitive work on fictions and language prepared for publication in Bentham's time, therefore it has to be reconstructed from a variety of sources: his papers as edited by 5 R. Harrison Bentham's life, well before he knew Stewart or Mill. 11 Though they both certainly played a role in the way the theory of fictions was formulated in the nineteenth century, they were not concerned directly with its genesis, and will therefore not be mentioned in this paper.
After considering in greater detail the problem of the sources of the theory of fictions, I shall try to assess its relevance to the two main directions in which the Enlightenment theory of language developed: the relationship between mind and language, and the quest for a satisfactory method of definition. Though Bentham addressed questions which were a common subject of enquiry in his time, the answers he gave reached deeper and gave language a central place on ontological grounds, which it did not have before. Ultimately, we will see that the integration of language study into a political and judicial system was precisely what allowed such a break from eighteenth-century tradition: in Bentham politics and law are human constructs, and are products of the will of the legislator and the people. They only exist through language, another human construct. Politics and law are symbolic creations that work in language, language itself being a symbolic system.
II. References and sources: the extent of the problem
Bentham's writings on language do not differ from the rest of his works insofar as they do not contain more than passing references to a number of selected, recurring sources. They seem therefore essentially personal and original. Bentham's method of composition is largely responsible for the lack of precise references or of organised analysis of sources: the theory of fictions, as we know, was not prepared for publication until after Bentham's death. In the search for sources, then, it is necessary to turn to other texts: Bentham's early correspondence -especially with his brother Samuel -reveals his familiarity with contemporary reflection on language and thought, and his letters to his friends keep us informed of the books he ordered from them. But it is only through a detailed study of the ideas of the time and of Bentham's relevance to them that the originality of his writings can be assessed. Bentham's relation to other writings is: it points to the fact that an attempt at recovering sources has to be part of a broader study of the relationship between
Bentham and the European Enlightenment as a whole.
The eighteenth-century concern with language and epistemology was an offspring of Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding the most influential theoretical work on the European Enlightenment. 18 Locke's main contention was the necessary correlation between the structure of language and that of thought itself, for which he proposed new bases. Because of its close connection to mind, language had to be studied as a means to an end: the improvement of knowledge and thought. 19 Harris's Hermes all to rags'. 29 But such radical statements seem to be misleading: less than two years later, he wrote to the same that he had 'derived considerable instruction from Harris'. 30 In the same way, Tooke was rarely mentioned without some more restrictive comments on his ability to conduct the matter further.
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The problematic nature of quotes in Bentham's text is in itself a central question in the search for sources: to what extent is the author to be trusted? Should imprecise reference be put down to faulty memory on his part or do they serve another purpose?
The problem is further complicated by the fact that reflection on language occupied
Bentham constantly throughout his life, though in a marginal or overtly political way before 1814. Precise references to contemporary linguistic thought are concentrated in his early correspondence, at the time when he was writing against Blackstone, but they become mere allusions in the proper works on language in the nineteenth century.
It has therefore to be assumed that he often relied on works he had read a long time ago, except in the case of Tooke's writings which were published at the turn of the century. The complexity of Bentham's relations to sources in his writings on language and fictions is obvious, and can only be untangled by a precise analysis of his theory.
III. Language, logic and mind. Classification of words, classification of knowledge.
As we have seen, the main premise of post-Lockean reflection on language was the necessary correlation between the structure of thought and that of language. To simple ideas corresponded 'names of simple ideas', whereas complex ideas and ideas of substance were represented by different categories of words: 'names of mixed modes', and 'names of substances'. 32 All subsequent theories were organised from this epistemological basis, and started with the postulate that language was the means of conveying thoughts from one mind to another. In the structure of his works on language and logic, Bentham shared this approach: his study of the nature of language is always paralleled with an exploration into the nature of human mind. Unclothed as yet in words, or stripped of them, thoughts are but dreams:
like the shifting clouds of the sky, they float in the mind one moment, and vanish out of it the next.
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In such a passage, language is presented as a necessary attribute of conscious thought, though distinct from it. The same idea is emphasised in the distinction between the 'transitive' and the 'intransitive' functions of thought: the transitive being fit for the purposes of communication, and the intransitive for solitary thought. 38 In that second sense, the connection between words and ideas is much tighter: 'the stock of a man's ideas is limited and determined by the stock of the words which he finds at his command for giving expression to his ideas'. 39 Locke, though he hinted at the necessity of language in the formation of thought, never expressed as clearly as that the close interdependency of the two faculties. Indeed, such a task was left to his successors, such as Hartley who wrote that 'many sensible impressions, and internal feelings, are associated with particular words and phrases, so as to give these the power of raising the corresponding ideas'. 40 Bentham's ideas on language and thought as inseparable were the expression of an ongoing trend in English philosophy.
The conditions for the 'Universal Grammar' rest on a conception of thought and language as the two sides of the same coin: Bentham opened his treaty on 'Universal
Grammar' with the statement that 'the connection between the demand and the supply, between thought and the signs employed for the communication of thought [were] points of necessary and universal agreement'. 41 In his attempts as a universal grammarian, Bentham inscribed his work within a tradition that went back to the seventeenth-century: the search for a 'philosophical', or 'universal' grammar.
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Browsing through the titles of the most significant works on language of the time reveals the extent of the preoccupation of thinkers with the common characteristics of Therefore, Bentham appears as the heir of a tradition that came to see language not only as the instrument but also as a constitutive part of the matter of thought. In his reflection on logic, this was made obvious: logical relations, expressed in words, do not exist outside language. Bentham's originality is in formulating a set of intuition that had been running in contemporary philosophy. But in putting the study of logic, and therefore of language, at the basis of the utilitarian system he initiated a major trend of focus: language study was not instrumental any longer, but formed the core of epistemology.
IV. Fiction and Definition.
The European Enlightenment was based on the idea that knowledge was attainable by Bentham's two-sided method of definition, by archetypation and by paraphrasis, is the outcome of a century of reflection which rooted the meaning of words in experience and found sense in propositions rather than in isolated words.
a) Towards archetypation.
As we have seen, the Benthamic system derives its justification from a close study of the world within a logical arrangement based on an analysis of language. Since that logical table is both organised in words and founded on 'a metaphysics of grammar', a system of definition is needed to make sense of the different categories that make up logical tables. The Ancient -and especially Aristotelian -sources of such a logical arrangement are acknowledged by Bentham in the opening pages of the 'Essay on Logic'. 58 In Aristotle too, the process of definition was closely related to the logical way in which knowledge was organised: things were defined by the way in which they related to the class to which they were identified as belonging. Within a logical arrangement, each term could be defined by its genus, the class it belonged to -the level immediately superior in a tree of knowledge -and its differentiam, the characteristics that made it different from all the other objects of the same class. In his early works, Bentham started from this method of definition to attack Blackstone:
What is the office of a definition? In the first place to convey to our apprehension some idea as signified by the word defined, and to teach us to distinguish the idea so signified by that word from any idea that can be signified by any other word.
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But he immediately pointed out the necessity of having a clear view of what the genus and the differentia referred to in a specific case. Blackstone's mistake was not only that he was unable of using such a system rigorously, but also that he had not realised how some words could not be thus explained. Though they could not be thus defined, names of simple ideas were the only ones which could be immediately known because they referred to sensation. Therefore, in
Locke's Essay, definition did not give immediate knowledge but was only a step towards knowledge by senses. In this light, the major concern of Locke's followers was to account for the existence and the significance of abstract ideas in a system that recognised only sense-perception as a test of existence. It was then possible to ascribe different modes of existence to things, according to the kind of definition that could apply to them. Locke clearly drew such conclusions when he wrote of mixed modes that 'they are the creatures of the understanding, rather than the works of nature:
conformable, I say, to this, we find, that their names lead our thoughts to the mind, and no farther'.
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Such an awareness of the problems of fixing the meaning of things was inscribed within the ongoing debate on nominalism, which had been revived by Hobbes after taking its sources in medieval thought. As Halévy explained:
nominalism was the theory according to which, "when a name is not used as a proper name, but as a common name, and serves to designate one or other of the objects of a group, we say it is a universal name; but this name 'universal' does not correspond to any reality in nature, it is the property of a name, the name of a name and nothing else:
there exists only individual beings, individuals make up the whole reality of the general idea'. 67 In the eighteenth-century, empiricism came in support of nominalism to produce the idea that words representing classes had a verbal reality to which nothing corresponded in nature. eighteenth-century is striking: Harris used it in his Hermes to account for the meaning of the word 'case' in its grammatical sense, but it was mainly with Horne Tooke that it was systematically used as a method of explanation. 73 In The Diversions of Purley, He afterwards credited Horne Tooke with laying the philosophical foundations that made the theory of fictions possible. 76 Apart from the method of etymological analysis itself, which was already present in Locke, it is the scientific aspect of Tooke's work that appealed most to Bentham: since it had been proven that language worked along scientific rules, it was possible to study it with an experimental method and find some kind of truth and consistency in it. Moreover, within a utilitarian system where the only valid system of reference was pain and pleasure, relating all words to sense-impressions was the only way to make sense of them. Following
Halévy's analysis, Aarsleff wrote that:
the discovery that all words can be reduced to names of sensation was eagerly accepted by the philosophic radicals, who took the proof to lie in the etymologies which they had neither the desire nor the competence to judge.
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Such an assertion has to be balanced in the case of Bentham: though archetypation is close to the etymological method, it does not depend on it solely. Etymology is only used to support the illustration given by the archetype, or emblem: though in
Chrestomathia the archetype of 'obligation' is based on its etymology, it is not mentioned as necessary in the 'Essay on Logic'. In that passage the archetype of 'obligation' is given as 'that of a man lying down, with a heavy body pressing upon him'. 78 Moreover, archetypation was never presented by Bentham as the only way of accounting for the meaning of a word: it was inseparable from paraphrasis.
b) Paraphrasis and the sentence as unit of meaning.
The main discovery Bentham has received credit for, in linguistic analysis, has been the claim that no meaning was to be found outside a proposition. Indeed, in the 'Essay on Language', he based his demonstration on the fact that even words spoken on their own were understood as complete sentences. Thus, calling out the name 'John' meant either 'John, come here' or 'John, listen'.
This being the case, if nothing less than the import of an entire proposition be sufficient for the giving full expression to any the most simple thought, it follows that no word, being anything more than a fragment of a proposition, no word is in itself the complete sign of any thought. 
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Hartley pushed the analysis of pronouns and particles further: he compared them to 'the unknown quantities in algebra, being determinable and decipherable, as one may say, only by means of the known words with which they are joined'. 87 The idea that some words had no meaning on their own but could only make sense within a sentence seems to have been frequent in the eighteenth-century: though Harris adopted explicitly an anti-empiricist outlook on language and experience, 88 There are many words used in abstract sciences, which can scarce be defined by any other words; and yet, by their grammatical form, seem to be excluded from the class of particles. Such are identity, existence, etc.
The use of those must therefore be learnt as that of particles is.
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Half a century later, Tooke's writings attacked the idea of a difference in nature between parts of speech, which allowed the generalisation of such an intuition.
Such a trend in the analysis of parts of speech developed within the framework of a new conception of the origins of language. When he accounted for the discovery that words are not significant outside a proposition, Bentham explained the methodological error that was at the root of misconceptions about the nature of language and meaning: the 'logical history of language' was a process of synthesis whereas the 'chronological history of language' was one of analysis. He then defined the former as the theoretical analysis of language into its parts as corresponding to the structure of thought, an essentially artificial outlook; and the latter as the historical process which found the actual origin of our language in "first words" which "in their Tooke also held this theory for granted when he wrote that 'the dominion of speech is erected upon the downfall of interjections'.
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The idea that words are not significant in themselves was thus the outcome of a tradition that went back to the roots of the European Enlightenment. Paraphrasis as a method of definition appears as an original development that blended the idea that words only made sense when related to sense-impression, and more precisely pleasure and pain, with that which considered the proposition as the smallest unit of meaning:
'phraseoplerosis', 'the filling up of the phrase', is the first and necessary step towards paraphrasis. 96 In this light, Bentham's originality is not where it has been previously seen, but rather in the idea that a proposition can only be said to be complete if it can be shown to express the will of the speaker: paraphrasis must make the source and recipient of pleasure or pain obvious. Simple propositions themselves are elliptical:
The proposition, simple as it is, is, in its import, complex; and if it be considered as designating. expressing, communication, the whole of the object of which it is employed as the sign, viz. the mode of being of my mind, it is elliptical. That to which it gives expression is the supposed matter of fact which (supposing me to speak truly) was the object of my thought; -that of which it does not contain the expression is that thought itself; the only matter of fact of which the discourse in question is strictly and immediately the assertion, is left to be inferred from the context, from such words as are actually uttered.
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Therefore, language can be understood as a system of will, which functions at two connotation as the result of human imposition. 98 The centrality of will is best illustrated by its role in the formation of fictitious entities: 'a fictitious entity is an entity to which, though by the grammatical form of the discourse employed in speaking of it existence is ascribed, yet in truth and in reality existence is not meant to be ascribed'. 99 Language is a product of the individual and of society as an aggregate of individuals.
V. Conclusion: the reform of language and the language of reform.
Understanding language as the manifestation of the individual's will-power has obvious social and political repercussions. The specificity of Bentham's theory of fictions is that it was elaborated as part of a wider plan for political, legal and social reform. But it also has deeper consequences on a philosophical level: language study appears to be a necessity for active political involvement, not only a bias to explore the workings of the mind. Quine showed that this was a characteristic feature of today's philosophy:
Another striking trait of scientific philosophy [since the nineteenth century] has been an increasing concern with the nature of language. In responsible circles this has not been a retreat from more serious issues. It is an outcome of critical scruples that are traceable centuries back in the classical British empiricists Locke, Berkeley and Hume, and are clearer in Bentham. It has been appreciated increasingly in the past sixty years that our traditional introspective notions -our notions of meaning, idea, concept, essence, all undisciplined and undefined-afford a hopelessly flabby and unmanageable foundations for a theory of the world. Control is gained by focusing on words, on how they are learned and used, and how they are related to things. 100 97 'Essay on Language', ibid., p. 321. 98 The moral opposition between eulogistic and dyslogistic words exists only in language, and is imposed by the speaker. See Deontology (CW), p. 14ff. 99 Ontology, appendix B, p. 164. 100 Quine, Theories and Things, p. 192.
It is maybe in that light that Bentham seems the most innovative: reform in politics was inseparable from reform in language. The parallel with John Horne Tooke is obvious: his activity in radical circles preceded Bentham's and his philosophy of language was a direct answer to his political action.
Like Horne Tooke, Bentham's interest for language was triggered by the need to find arguments against political opponents: Blackstone's failure to define his words and to grasp their meaning is one of the main lines of attack in the Fragment on Government. In the same way, Tooke's Letter to Dunning was written while the author was in prison, to criticise the court's interpretation of the case. 101 In both cases, language appeared as a tool to bring about a reformation in politics, though in
Bentham's case there was a shift in the political goal pursued at the beginning of the nineteenth century. 102 Both these attempts were in line with the trend that developed at the end of the eighteenth century and which linked the appearance of political and social consciousness to a reappropriation of language: for radical thinkers, it was necessary to put an end to the domination that the ruling few exercised through language. 103 Language study was a process of demystification, against 'all the different systems of metaphysical, (i.e. verbal) imposture'. 104 It worked by showing that speech was the only moral and political reality: for Bentham and Tooke there was no thought outside language, and the criterion of truth was to be set within language, by language itself. Etymology and paraphrasis stressed that words were only understandable as part of a linguistic system and not with reference to any outside criteria of truth: meaning was imposed by society and the individual. The parallel between Bentham's analysis of the word 'right' and Tooke's is especially interesting in this respect: they both stripped the word of its moral connotation to show that it only made sense as a legal construct. Tooke's etymology ran thus:
RIGHT is no other than RECT-um (regitum), the past participle of the In both these definitions, meaning is fixed by the will of the legislator through language.
Accordingly, the majority of Bentham's writings on language deal with ways of knowing it in order to control it: the list of 'properties desirable in a language' had no other use that:
in respect to them [man] may employ [his native language] to the most advantage, that he may, on every occasion, be able to endue his language with these several desirable properties, and that in the proportions which, on the occasion in question, are best adapted to use.
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Practical uses come first, and it is the task of the individual as well as of government authority to carry out reforms in language. 108 Such a view must be understood within the framework we have set in parts III and IV: it is not purely a study of language as means to an end that is superior to it (improvement of political and legal discourse) but rather as the necessary ontological foundation of law and politics. A reform in language is necessary because language, as a symbolic system, sets the framework in which law and politics work. 109 It is necessary because the study of language is the study of political relationship within a society understood in terms of individual willpower.
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The originality of Bentham's theory of fictions can now be better assessed: it is because he came to language study as a means to solve legal and political problems that he was brought to see discourse as the necessary symbolic foundation of another symbolic system: that of power relationships within society. Though such an approach to linguistic theory was essentially original and led to more radical conclusions than what the eighteenth century had proposed, it was formulated in terms that fitted in the 
